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FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY:
THE LEGAL BATTLE FOR INCREASED STATE
FUNDING OF POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS
IN NEW YORK
Brian J. Nickerson*
and Gerard M. Deenihan**
INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits challenging New York State's public elementary and
secondary school funding formulas have followed, in several re-
spects, the school finance litigation trends in other state and federal
courts. The most notable linkage lies with New York plaintiffs' in-
corporation of doctrinal developments from successful litigation at-
tacking public school funding systems in other states. As this
Article demonstrates, the first New York school finance case,
Board of Education, Levittown Union Free District v. Nyquist1
("Levittown") commenced after victorious public school funding
cases in California, Serrano v. Priest,2 and New Jersey, Robinson v.
Cahill.3
The Serrano and Robinson cases provided a useful litigation
blueprint for raising legal challenges to state public elementary and
secondary school funding systems based largely upon "equity"
principles and arguments.4 Equity-based challenges in school fi-
nance litigation rely primarily upon state constitutional equality or
equal protection provisions.5 The most typical equity argument
raised by plaintiffs is that a state public school funding system,
* Director, The Edwin G. Michaelian Institute for Public Policy and Manage-
ment; Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, Dyson Col-
lege of Arts and Sciences, Pace University; J.D., Pace University; Ph.D., Suny-
Albany.
** Research Associate, The Edwin G. Michaelian Institute of Public Policy and
Management, Pace University; J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law,
2003; M.A., Fordham University, 2001.
1. See generally 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
2. 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971).
3. 303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973).
4. See Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1252 (discussing plaintiff's argument "that there is a
correlation between a district's per pupil assessed valuation and the wealth of its re-
sidents"); see also Robinson, 303 A.2d at 291-93 (discussing state statutes' creation of
an equitable school system).
5. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1249-55; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 288-98.
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which relies largely upon local property taxes, is inherently unfair
or impermissibly disadvantages poorer school districts.6 Plaintiffs
also frequently point to specific provisions within state financing
practices benefiting wealthier public school districts at the expense
of allocating more funds to poorer districts.7
Although the Levittown litigation was eventually unsuccessful,8
in 1989, school finance reform advocates and interest groups were
encouraged by three successful cases in Montana, 9 Kentucky, 10 and
Texas.11 These cases provided a related, but newer, legal argument
revolving around a theory of "adequacy" to challenge state public
elementary and secondary school finance practices. 2 Adequacy-
based challenges revolve around the interpretation of education ar-
ticles or guarantees found in respective state constitutions whereby
plaintiffs argue that children in poorer school districts are deprived
of a legally "adequate" level of education. 13 Plaintiffs frequently
cite numerous inadequacies in education services, such as school
facilities, lack of textbooks and qualified teachers, inferior com-
puters, etc., to bolster claims that a state fails to meet its burden of
providing an adequate public education to all school children in a
given state.14 Consequently, plaintiffs commonly assert that more
state funding needs to be diverted to poorer school districts to ad-
dress any inadequacy. 5
Both the development in the 1989 cases and the New York Court
of Appeals' recognition in Levittown that they could entertain fu-
ture claims of a "gross and glaring inadequacy" in public education
currently provides New York education finance reform groups with
a new angle from which to challenge the state's public school fund-
ing formulas.' 6
6. See, e.g., Robinson, 303 A.2d at 293 (discussing New Jersey's school system).
7. Professional educators often refer to this as an "input" problem whereby
money is considered one of the key input variables resulting in improved educational
services or "outputs" within a school district. Id. at 277.
8. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369-70 (N.Y. 1982).
9. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989).
10. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989).
11. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498-99 (Tex. 1991).
12. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 219; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690;
Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 496-97.
13. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190-96; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
688-90; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 495-98.
14. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198 (discussing the disparity between school dis-
tricts in poor and affluent neighborhoods).
15. See, e.g., Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 496-97 (stating that inequality will be solved
only by diverting more funds to poor school districts).
16. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982).
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Part I of this Article evaluates the influence of federal courts'
school finance cases on the New York school finance groups' deci-
sion to litigate in the New York courts. Particular attention is paid
to the holding, rationale, judgment, and legal claims of interest
groups in relevant school finance cases decided by the United
States District Court and the United States Supreme Court in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,17 which effec-
tively closed the federal courts' door to school finance claims.
Part II analyzes the importance of other states' legal precedents
in school finance cases as a factor influencing interest groups in
New York to challenge the state's public education funding
formulas.
Part III discusses in detail the progression of public elementary
and secondary school funding formula litigation in New York, be-
ginning with Levittown, up to the most recent case, Campaign for
Fiscal Equities, Inc. v. State of New York.1 8 The discussion focuses
on the legal arguments raised by various interest group-plaintiffs
and traces the development of those arguments to school finance
cases in other states. Finally, the conclusion highlights the poten-
tial course of school finance reform in New York State.
I. FEDERAL SCHOOL FINANCE CASES
The equity ideas upon which the first public school finance cases
relied upon begins in some respects with the decision handed down
by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.19 During the 1950s, "Jim Crow segregation" laws discrimi-
nated against African-Americans in places of public
accommodation, including public schools. 20 During the early
1950s, a number of African-American students in Delaware, Kan-
sas, South Carolina, and Virginia, through their legal representa-
tives-the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
Persons ("NAACP")-filed suit in order to racially integrate pub-
lic schools using the argument that segregated schools violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 21 A
three-judge panel of the United States District Court denied the
relief sought by the plaintiffs, relying on the "separate but equal"
17. 411 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1973).
18. 655 N.E.2d 661, 663-64 (N.Y. 1995) (arguing that the state's public school fi-
nancing system was unconstitutional).
19. 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954).
20. Id. at 487.
21. Id. at 486.
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doctrine established in 1896 by the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson.22
All four state cases made their way to the United States Su-
preme Court and were heard together.2 3 In delivering the unani-
mous opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Earl Warren began by recognizing both the importance of public
education to society and trial evidence demonstrating inequality in
facilities, curricula, and salaries of teachers between African-
American schools and white schools.2 4 The Court determined that
segregation of public schools based upon racial classifications vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause. It is generally understood that
Brown served as a catalyst for many civil rights cases, including
education reform litigation involving school finance in state and
federal judiciaries.
In the summer of 1968, Demitro Rodriguez and a group of other
Mexican-American parents-whose children attended elementary
and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict (an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas)-filed a law-
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas against the Board of Education, the Commissioner of Educa-
tion, the Attorney General of Texas, the Bexar County Board of
Trustees, and seven local school districts in the San Antonio metro-
politan area.26 At trial, a great deal of evidence was introduced
surrounding the Texas system of school finance, the foundation of
which was traced back to the late nineteenth century.27
The Texas Constitution provides for the establishment of a sys-
tem of free schools.2 8 The constitution was amended in 1883 to
empower local school districts to levy ad valorem real property
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the maintenance of the
free system of public schools.2 9 Locally raised funds were supple-
mented by revenue from the Available School Fund, a state-run
program funded through a state ad valorem property tax and other
state taxes. 30 The Texas legislature responded in 1947 to growing
disparities in the value of assessable property between local dis-
22. 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
23. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486-89.
24. Id. at 493-94.
25. Id. at 495.
26. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
27. Id. at 6-14.
28. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
29. Id. art. VII, § 3; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6-7.
30. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 7.
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tricts. 31 They appointed an eighteen-member committee composed
of legislators and educators, to explore alternative systems used in
other states and to propose a funding scheme guaranteeing mini-
mum educational services to each child in Texas that would over-
come interdistrict disparities in taxable resources.32 The efforts of
the committee resulted in the enactment of the Gilmer-Aikin bills
establishing the Texas Minimum Foundations School Program,33
which was the system challenged by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez.34
The Texas program provided for local and state contributions to
a fund earmarked for teacher salaries, operating expenses, and
transportation costs. 35 The State, which supplied funds from its
general revenue, financed approximately eighty percent of the pro-
gram's cost, while the local school districts, acting as a single unit,
financed the remaining twenty percent.36 The latter's share, re-
ferred to as the Local Fund Assignment, was apportioned among
the school districts under a complex formula designed to reflect the
relative local real property taxpaying ability of each district.37
The plaintiffs challenged this system on the ground that it vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion by discriminating against school children residing in poorer
districts, while favoring those residing in more affluent districts.38
At trial, the petitioners compared their neighborhood, the
Edgewood Independent School District (one of the poorest in the
San Antonio area), with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District (one of the most affluent in that area).39
Approximately 22,000 students, of which ninety percent were
Mexican-American, were enrolled in twenty-five elementary and
secondary schools within Edgewood Independent School District
at the time of the trial.40 The average assessed property value per
pupil was $5,960 and the median family income was $4,686.41 As a
result, Edgewood district taxpayers contributed only twenty-six
dollars per pupil for the 1967-68 school year.42
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id.
33. S. 115-117, 1949 Leg., 50th Sess. (Tex. 1949).
34. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 69.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Id.
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On the other hand, approximately 5,000 students, who were pri-
marily white, attended the six elementary and secondary schools
within Alamo Heights Independent School District.4 3 Only ap-
proximately eighteen percent of the student population was of
Mexican-American descent. 4 The average assessed property value
per pupil at that time exceeded $49,000 and the median family in-
come was approximately $8,001. 45 As a result, the district contrib-
uted $333 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school
year, which was $307 more than the Edgewood District.46
The plaintiffs relied upon an affidavit submitted by Professor
Joel S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy
Institute; Professor Berke is a well-known advocate of school fi-
nance reform.47 His affidavit was based upon a survey of ten per-
cent of the school districts in Texas and it demonstrated: 1) that a
positive correlation existed between the wealth of school districts,
measured in terms of their assessable real property wealth per pu-
pil, and their levels of education expenditures per pupil; and 2) that
a positive correlation existed between the wealth of each district
and the personal wealth of its residents.48
In December 1971, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas rendered its judgment in a per curiam
opinion using a standard of strict scrutiny to judge the Texas school
funding system.49 The court found that personal wealth represents
a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, and furthermore, that education is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. °
Consequently, the court determined, in light of the evidence sub-
mitted at trial, that the Texas school finance system operated to the
disadvantage of school children residing in poorer districts and in-
terfered with the exercise of the fundamental right to receive an
education.5'
After the court rendered its judgment, the State of Texas ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court, which issued a writ of
43. Id. at 12-13.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id. at 26.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id.
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certiorari and heard oral arguments on October 12, 1972.52 It
should be noted that the Attorney General and other public offi-
cials from a number of other states filed amicus curiae briefs be-
cause they feared the prospects of similar lawsuits in their own
states, and urged the Supreme Court to reverse the decision of the
lower court.53 Several interest groups-the American Civil Liber-
ties Union ("ACLU"), the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, and the National Education Association-filed amicus cu-
riae briefs urging the Supreme Court to affirm the decision of the
district court.54
The Supreme Court on March 21, 1973, in an opinion by Justice
Lewis Powell, held that it was not a proper case in which to ex-
amine a state's laws under standards of strict scrutiny because the
plaintiffs had not shown that the Texas system discriminated
against any definable class of "poor" people and, thus, was not
shown to discriminate against any suspect classification. Addi-
tionally, the Court found that the Texas system did not interfere
with the exercise of any fundamental right protected by the United
States Constitution, because education does not represent such a
right and the case involved the issues of local taxation, fiscal plan-
ning, education policy, and federalism; issues beyond the Court's
proper scope of authority. 6 Consequently, the Court used the less
stringent standard of deferential scrutiny in judging whether the
Texas school funding system constitutional.57
With respect to the assertion that the Texas system discriminated
against some "suspect classification," the Supreme Court noted
that this case contained "no definitive description of the classifying
facts or delineation of the disfavored class."58 The Supreme Court
reasoned that only those whose income falls below the poverty
level might constitute a suspect classification.59 Since the plaintiffs,
however, made no effort to demonstrate that the Texas system op-
erated to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as
indigent or as composed of persons whose incomes were beneath
any designated poverty level, the Court could not find the exis-
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id. at 19-20.
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tence of a suspect class.6" Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that a "lack of personal resources had occasioned an
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit," i.e., education.61
In considering the plaintiffs' fundamental right argument, the
Court noted its belief, as previously articulated in its decision in
Brown, that education represents one of the most important ser-
vices provided by the various states.62 The Court added that the
importance of a service provided by the various states does not
determine whether it represents a fundamental right protected by
the United States Constitution, and at no time had the Court rec-
ognized education as such a right.63 Consequently, the Court
opined that it could not be said that the Texas system of school
finance interfered with the exercise of a "fundamental right" guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution.64
Finally, the Court concluded that the case represented "a direct
attack on the [manner] in which Texas [chose] to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. ' 65 The Court believed that it was
"asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on [its] po-
litical subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nue for local interests. '66 This political question represents an area
in which the Court has traditionally deferred to states' legisla-
tures. 67 Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the Rodri-
guez case did not represent a proper case in which to strictly
scrutinize a state's laws.68
Hence, the Court utilized the standard of deferential scrutiny in
its examination of the constitutionality of the system established
under the Texas Minimum Foundations School Program.69 Under
this standard, the Texas system bore a rational relation to two in-
terrelated "legitimate governmental interests": 1) ensure a basic
education for every child in Texas; and 2) permit and encourage a
large measure of local voter participation in and control over each
district's schools. 0 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
60. Id. at 25.
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id. at 29 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
63. Id. at 35.
64. Id. at 37.
65. Id. at 40.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 44.
69. See id. at 41-44 (refusing to apply strict judicial scrutiny because these were
matters that the legislature was more familiar with).
70. Id. at 49.
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the district court and determined the system established under the
Texas Minimum Foundations School Program was constitutional.71
The Rodriguez decision closed the federal courts to school fi-
nance challenges based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and, consequently, shifted the public
school finance litigation's emphasis to state government.72 School
finance equity advocates who wished to litigate had to turn their
efforts to state courts and use equal protection provisions or educa-
tion clauses of state constitutions.
In stressing the influence of federal school finance litigation on
New York cases, Daniel P. Levitt, lead counsel of the Levittown
and Reform Education Finance Inequities Today ("REFIT") coali-
tions in New York's education funding cases, emphasized that the
groups studied the progression of the Rodriguez, Serrano, and
Robinson cases because they were seen as seminal test cases for
school finance litigation.73 Levitt stated:
the idea for commencing the Levittown litigation actually began
in an advanced seminar on constitutional litigation at Columbia
Law School in 1974 whereby the class drafted model pleadings
for a school finance case as an academic exercise. The Rodri-
guez decision had come down a year earlier and we [the class]
were well aware of the procedural and doctrinal implications for
future school finance litigation.74
The Campaign for Fiscal Equities ("CFE") coalition also
stressed that their decision to commence a public school finance
suit in New York State court was due to the unfavorable (to school
finance reformers) decision rendered in Rodriquez as well as suc-
cessful state cases in Montana, Kentucky, and Texas.75 Jessica Gar-
cia of CFE noted "we view the federal courts as mostly closed to
substantive school finance claims, but we include a federal claim
71. Id. at 55.
72. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT EDUCATION CASES 248-59 (Steve McEllis-
trem ed., 10th ed. 2002). The United States Supreme Court, however, still decides
cases affecting public schooling, such as ones involving school prayer and free speech.
E.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001) (discussing
whether a denial of the use of school grounds for after school use was a free speech
violation); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294-95 (2000) (discussing
whether student led prayers prior to football games are a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause).
73. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, Lead Counsel, Levittown Coalition, in Scar-
sdale, N.Y. (June 27, 2001) (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, Outreach Coordinator, Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. (June 25, 2001).
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under Title VI to preserve a federal right of appeal in the event of
an unfavorable decision by the New York Court of Appeals."76
Thus, the Levittown and Campaign for Fiscal Equities77 litigations
in New York have been directly influenced by the Supreme Court
decision in Rodriquez.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL DOCTRINE IN STATE
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
This Part analyzes legal precedents established in key school fi-
nance cases in California, New Jersey, Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas. These cases/states are chosen because the California and
New Jersey litigants were the first to use equity-based legal claims
successfully, while the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas litigants
were the first to use adequacy-based legal claims successfully.7 8
Analysis of these cases is followed by a detailed evaluation of
school finance cases in New York.
Legal challenges to public school finance systems have been an
active area of state court litigation since 1971, when plaintiffs suc-
cessfully challenged California's public school funding system in
Serrano v. Priest.79 The litigants, a group of parents of school chil-
dren in the Baldwin Park school district in Los Angeles County,
claimed that the state aid portion of the local property tax-based
school finance system violated the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Califor-
nia State Constitution's provision requiring that "all laws of a gen-
eral nature have uniform operation."80 The parents submitted
evidence demonstrating that, despite paying a tax rate less than
one-half of that of Baldwin Park, Beverly Hills residents were able
to spend twice as many dollars per student as were the residents of
Baldwin Park and, consequently, Beverly Hills schools provided a
superior education.81
The California Supreme Court held that education is a funda-
mental right 82 and that children residing in California's poorer dis-
tricts represented a "suspect" class under the Equal Protection
Clause.83 The court agreed with the plaintiffs' position by conclud-
76. Id.
77. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
78. Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, supra note 75.
79. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971).
80. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
81. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1248.
82. Id. at 1258.
83. Id. at 1250-52.
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ing that the State's reliance on local property taxes to fund public
education produced significant per-pupil expenditure disparities
between school districts and resulted in real property wealth as the
primary determinant of the quality of a child's education. 84 Conse-
quently, the court applied a standard of "strict judicial scrutiny"
requiring the state to demonstrate that the funding system fur-
thered a compelling governmental interest; because the court
found no such interest, however, it declared the California school
funding system unconstitutional. s5
School finance reform advocates in other states understandably
were optimistic about the possibility of achieving funding policy
changes through equity-based litigation after the Serrano decision,
and filed at least thirty similar equal protection based claims
against public education funding systems in various state trial
courts in the subsequent eighteen months.86 The Serrano plaintiffs'
success also fueled the attempt by reformers to use the United
States Supreme Court to challenge the Texas public school funding
system in the Rodriguez case.
The highest courts in most states have heard and decided an im-
portant school finance case since the Serrano decision, including
Robinson v. Cahill87 in New Jersey, decided approximately two
weeks after Rodriguez in 1971.88 The cities of Jersey City, Patter-
son, Plainfield, and East Orange challenged the constitutionality of
the state's school funding system, which permitted wide variations
in per-pupil expenditures from district to district.8 9
The Robinson plaintiffs alleged that wealth-based disparities de-
prived city students of a "thorough and efficient" education in vio-
lation of the New Jersey Constitution that required the state
legislature to "provide for the maintenance and support of a thor-
ough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction
of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eigh-
84. Id. at 1263.
85. Id.
86. William Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses after Ser-
rano, 16 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 11 (1997).
87. 303 A.2d 273, 295-98 (N.J. 1973) (holding that New Jersey's existing system of
financing schools was unconstitutional).
88. Evans et al., supra note 86, at 11; Douglas Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rod-
riguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32
LAW & Soc. REV. 176, 176-77 (1998). By 1999, thirty-six state high courts have ren-
dered a decision in a school finance case and at least forty-three states have rendered
some decision in the lower courts. Evans et al., supra note 86, at 11; Reed, supra, at
176-77.
89. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 276.
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teen."9 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the state fund-
ing system was unconstitutional. 91 It interpreted the wide
disparities in per-pupil expenditures as violating the state constitu-
tional based-requirement that all students be provided equal edu-
cational opportunity, which the court viewed as critical to the
effective preparation of children for citizenship and for the
workforce.92 The Robinson decision restored equity proponents'
optimism that state court litigation could mandate public school fi-
nance reform.93
This renewed optimism was also apparent in New York State
when the Levittown School District and twenty-six other school
districts spending less than the state average on public education
challenged the state funding system as unconstitutional. 94 The Lev-
ittown plaintiffs adopted the arguments of the Serrano litigants,
claiming that the New York State system impermissibly allowed
school expenditures to vary with property wealth, which, in turn,
affected the educational opportunity available to students.95 Even
though the New York Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' eq-
uity arguments, reform advocates continued to use the New York
courts to challenge the state funding system.96
The general state trend in school funding litigation after Serrano
and Robinson and prior to 1989 primarily focused on the use of
state constitutional guarantees of equality to challenge school
funding practices. 97 Plaintiffs mostly used equity-based arguments
by claiming that state financing systems, relying heavily upon reve-
nues from local property taxes, discriminated against students in
low-wealth property districts because of the relatively lower values
of taxable property per student. 98 State courts, however, consist-
ently required a clear showing by plaintiffs that either a use of
wealth classifications for the distribution of state educational funds
90. Id. at 285; see N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
91. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295.
92. Id. at 294 (quoting Landis v. Ashworth, 31 A. 1017 (N.J. 1895)).
93. A comprehensive assessment of the Robinson case and its impact is provided
by RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM 165-73 (1978).
94. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 361-63 (N.Y. 1982).
95. Id. at 361-62.
96. Id. at 366.
97. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219, 222-32 (1990).
98. Id.; see Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and
the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alterna-
tive Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 572-77 (1998).
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automatically was discriminatory and, therefore, more deserving of
heightened judicially scrutiny, or that the finance system in ques-
tion was not reasonably related to a legitimate state function.99
The state court equity-based cases after Robinson had mixed re-
sults for plaintiffs because of the substantial evidentiary burden of
proving government sponsored educational discrimination and the
difficulty in establishing a precise standard defining legal equity.
A new trend in state court school finance litigation emerged af-
ter 1989 and was led by important state court decisions in Mon-
tana, Kentucky, and Texas. 10 The Montana State Supreme Court,
in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State of Montana,
adjudicated a class-action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of the Montana system of school finance. 1°' During the 1985-88
school year, Montana used a foundation system to fund local
schools whereby the State provided funds for basic operations.
10 2
Most local school districts, however, had budgets that exceeded the
funds provided under the state foundation system and thus, were
forced to generate supplemental revenue through local real prop-
erty taxation. 03 Since many property-poor local school districts
were unable to generate a sufficient amount of supplemental reve-
nue, they allegedly were unable to provide their students with an
adequate education mandated by the Montana Constitution.1
0 4
The Montana Supreme Court, on February 1, 1989, relying upon
the Education Clause of the Montana Constitution, delivered its
unanimous opinion that "equality of educational opportunity is
guaranteed to each person of the state."'1 5 The court subsequently
ruled that the State's foundation system failed to provide sufficient
funds to achieve even a minimal level of quality, and that it had
failed to provide a system of public education where each student
could enjoy the equal educational opportunity guaranteed under
the Education Clause of the Montana Constitution.1
0 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Rose v. Council For Better Ed-
ucation Inc., heard a similar class action lawsuit challenging the
99. Id. at 574-76.
100. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989); He-
lena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498-99 (Tex. 1991).
101. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 685.
102. Id. at 686.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 687-89.
105. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
106. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690.
2003] 1353
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
constitutionality of the school finance system that used a combina-
tion of state funds, federal funds, and district revenue generated
through local real property taxation to satisfy the mandate of the
Kentucky Constitution."°7 On June 8, 1989, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that all Kentucky school children have the right to an
adequate education under the Kentucky Constitution. 0 8 The court
found that Kentucky's school finance system violated the state con-
stitutional right of children residing within many property-poor lo-
cal school districts because they were not receiving an education of
adequate quality, especially compared to the education provided
by wealthier districts.' 0 9
The Texas Supreme Court, in Edgewood Independent School
District v. Kirby, also heard a similar class action lawsuit. 110 By the
mid-1980s, there existed an even larger real property wealth gap
between certain districts than during the Rodriguez litigation."'
On October 2, 1989, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the
Education Clause of the Texas Constitution mandates that the
Texas State Legislature provide an "efficient" system of free public
schools and that the legislature had failed to meet this
obligation112
These state cases are important because the plaintiffs success-
fully raised questions as to whether the respective state was "ade-
quately" fulfilling its obligation under the education provisions of
its constitution, rather than using equality arguments as the plain-
tiffs did in the Serrano and Robinson cases.1 1 3 This adequacy-
based argument focuses on the quality of education, in contrast to
the equality of funding, provided to children in poor districts and
can be used to demonstrate that inadequate educational services
violate a state's constitutional obligation to provide for a basic or
sound education to its citizens. 4 It also incorporates an attack on
state funding systems relying heavily upon local property tax-based
107. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989). The
constitutional mandate was that the Kentucky General Assembly shall "provide an
efficient system of common schools throughout the state." Id.
108. Id. at 206, 212.
109. Id. at 215.
110. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. 1991).
111. Compare id. at 496, with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 74-75 (1973).
112. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 498.
113. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769
P.2d 684, 685-86 (Mont. 1989); Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 498-99.
114. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
690; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 498-99.
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financing primarily because plaintiffs have been able to establish
that states do not provide poor districts with proper levels of fund-
ing to achieve an adequate level or quality of education.115 In a
sense, the adequacy argument focuses on the outcomes of allegedly
inequitable funding of education as opposed to exclusively arguing
that the funding, per se, is inequitable.1 16 The adequacy argument
also avoids plaintiff groups' reliance on the federal equal protec-
tion doctrine, avoiding the difficulty and courts' apparent reluc-
tance to precisely define equity.117
Most state court litigation throughout the 1990s has been shifting
away from equity-based legal doctrine to an adequacy-based legal
doctrine because of the plaintiffs' successes in Kentucky, Montana,
and Texas, and the ostensibly more well-received legal claims.
Plaintiffs launched a broader attack on a variety of educational
practices, including funding issues, with a higher degree of suc-
cess.1 1 8 Post-Levittown school finance litigation by reform groups
in New York State has followed this trend of moving away from the
direct use of equity arguments towards the use of more promising
adequacy arguments.
III. NEW YORK SCHOOL FINANCE CASES
Different interest group coalitions advocating greater school fi-
nance equity since 1974 initiated legal challenges to New York
State's school funding formula in the state courts. The involved
interest groups are the Levittown Group, REFIT, and the Cam-
paign for Fiscal Equity.
A. Board of Education, Levittown Union Free
School District v. Nyquist
A coalition of twenty-seven local school districts throughout the
state, led by the Levittown district, filed a cause of action in New
York State Supreme Court, Nassau County, in 1974, and argued
significant differentials in district per pupil property wealth re-
sulted in unacceptable differences in per pupil expenditures,
thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause and Education Arti-
115. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 228-29; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
688-89; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 497-98.
116. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196-99; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
687-89; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 495-96.
117. E.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 201; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
685.
118. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 104-15
(1995).
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cle of the New York State Constitution.' 19 In particular, the school
districts claimed that the New York school finance system was un-
constitutional because the system discriminated against students in
low real property-wealth districts by making the allocation of edu-
cational resources largely a function of the local real property
wealth of the school districts. 120 The plaintiffs stressed the random-
ness of local property wealth distribution as the primary factor de-
termining allocation of the state's public education funds.12'
Prior to the commencement of the trial, local boards of educa-
tion, resident taxpayers, and students in New York City, Buffalo,
Rochester, and Syracuse, together with a host of local parent-
teacher associations in the City of New York, joined the lawsuit. 122
Without objection by any of the original parties, they joined as in-
tervenor-plaintiffs on the grounds that the issues raised by the orig-
inal plaintiffs did not address the unique problems faced by urban
school systems.123 The intervenor-plaintiffs, however, relied gener-
ally on the same legal basis as the original plaintiffs.124
At the time of trial, the New York school finance system con-
sisted of a combination of state aid, federal funds, and local reve-
nue generated by local real property taxation. 125 The New York
State Legislature provided each local school district with a uni-
form, minimum per-pupil grant purportedly to ensure that a basic
education was provided to every student attending a public school
within the State. 2 6 This grant amounted to $1,885 per pupil during
the 1974-75 school year. 12 7
A key piece of evidence submitted at trial by the original plain-
tiffs was a detailed report prepared by two expert witnesses, Joel S.
Berke, a school finance expert whose affidavit comprised the heart
of the plaintiffs' case in Rodriguez, and Jay H. Moskowitz, who
used a large volume of official New York State education finance
data.' 28 Berke and Moskowitz first demonstrated the existence of
a substantial disparity among New York's 708 local school districts
119. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
120. Id. at 610.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 608.
123. Id. at 619-20.
124. Id. at 608.
125. Id. at 614.
126. Id. at 613.
127. Id. at 615.
128. JOEL S. BERKE ET AL., POLITICIANS, JUDGES, AND CITY SCHOOLS: RE-
FORMING SCHOOL FINANCE IN NEW YORK 32-33 (1984).
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in the distribution of taxable real property. 2 9 There existed more
than $412,000 worth of taxable real property per student in the
richest district.1 30 In contrast, there existed less than $9,000 worth
of real taxable property per student in the poorest district.'
3
'
Berke and Moskowitz also found the variation in taxable wealth
per student during the year 1974-75 ranged from more than $86,000
to less than $21,000 (a ratio of approximately four-to-one) when
considering only the median eighty percent of all districts above
the ten percent and below the ninety percent per pupils pending. 32
Other evidence in Berke and Moskowitz's report demonstrated
a very strong correlation between the assessed value of the real
property contained within each local school district and the amount
of education funds expended per student by each district.133 While
the highest spending local school district in New York raised $4,200
through local real property taxation, the lowest spending district
raised less than $1,000 per student during the 1974-75 school
year. 1
34
Moreover, Berke and Moskowitz established that the real prop-
erty wealth of each local school district was linked directly to the
per-pupil education expenditures of each district.135 In other
words, the wealthier districts exhibited greater per-pupil education
expenditures, while the poorer districts exhibited smaller per-pupil
education expenditures. Berke and Moskowitz contended that this
correlation was "direct, positive, and significant. 1 36 They stopped
short, however, of arguing that interdistrict disparities in property
value caused or brought about interdistrict disparities in per-pupil
education expenditures. 137
Finally, the report concluded that the interdistrict disparities in
per-pupil education expenditures had a "regular, direct, and dis-
criminatory impact upon the educational opportunities afforded to
the various public school children" within the State of New
York.138 While those children residing in property-rich local school
districts received an education of a comparatively higher quality,
129. Id. at 32.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 32-33.
134. Id. at 33.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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those residing in property-poor local school districts received an
education of a comparatively lower quality.139 Berke and Mosko-
witz found, for instance, a strong positive correlation between a
local school district's per-pupil education expenditures and its abil-
ity to attract teachers and professional staff members with superior
qualifications.14 °
The remainder of the original plaintiffs' case consisted of lengthy
testimony given by various administrators, teachers, parents, and
students from many of the twenty-seven local school districts that
filed the lawsuit. 141 The purpose of such testimony, according to
the lead counsel, was to put a "human face" on the statistics re-
ported by Berke and Moskowitz.' 42 The plaintiffs also offered tes-
timony by the superintendents of a number of property-rich local
school districts, such as Great Neck and Scarsdale, in order to
demonstrate the educational benefits associated with greater per
pupil expenditures. 143 Finally, the plaintiffs offered a number of
plans to eliminate the inequities existing within the system, that
could be exacted by the state legislature.14 4
Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, because property-poor lo-
cal school districts were less able to generate local revenue through
local real property taxation than were property-rich local school
districts, the education of students residing in property-poor dis-
tricts was not equivalent to that of students residing in property-
rich districts. 145 This inequality was in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the New York Constitution and the United
States Constitution, as well as the Education Article of the New
York Constitution. 46
Intervenor-plaintiffs representing four big city school districts-
Buffalo, New York, Rochester, and Syracuse-underscored the
special concerns of large urban districts. 147 They argued that citi-
zens' greater demands for increased municipal services prevented
the cities from funding education more fully, and that a school fi-
nance system that fails to compensate for this municipal overbur-
139. Id. at 33-35.
140. Id. at 33-34.
141. Id. at 35.
142. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, supra note 73.
143. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 35.
144. Id. at 38-39.
145. Id. at 33-35.
146. Id. at 39-41.
147. Id. at 35-41.
1358
FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY
den was unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional.148 The cities'
central position was that the state aid formula overstated the abil-
ity of urban districts to support education from local real property
tax revenues because the state ignored the differences between
large urban districts and non-urban ones in fiscal capacity, educa-
tional needs, and school operating costs. 14
9
The intervenor-plaintiffs presented four overburdens unique to
large urban districts in New York that allegedly constrained the
ability of such districts to finance public schools:
1. The Municipal Services Overburden
Due to the great needs of urban populations for police, fire, san-
itation, and welfare services, which impose a massive burden on
the fiscal resources of major cities, urban school districts are un-
able to devote a high percentage of their revenue towards edu-
cation. These service requirements are necessary given the
nature of large cities and do not simply represent the "tastes" of
their residents.
2. The Cost Overburden
Due to higher teacher salaries and higher costs of operation, the
costs of education are unavoidably higher in large cities than in
other non-urban districts. The urban tax dollar, therefore, buys
fewer educational services than does the suburban tax dollar.
3. The Absenteeism Overburden
The formula utilized by the State in measuring fiscal capacity
and distributing education funds counts students by attendance
instead of enrollment. This system penalizes urban school dis-
tricts due to the greater rates of absenteeism that typically exist
within such districts. The effect of this system is to reduce the
amount of aid received by urban school districts at the same
time that greater absenteeism raises remedial services costs.
4. The Education Overburden
Despite the higher concentration within urban school districts of
students with special needs, such as handicapped and non-En-
glish-speaking students, who are far more expensive to educate
than typical students, urban school districts receive lower per-
pupil aid to meet these needs than do other local school
districts.15°
148. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. 1982); BERKE ET AL., supra
note 128, at 39.
149. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 38-39.
150. Id. at 38-39.
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In essence, the cities contended that the state aid system was dis-
criminatory because it did not give any consideration to the unique
overburdens faced by cities. 1
In response, the State attempted to demonstrate the constitu-
tionality of the New York school finance system despite its ac-
knowledged imperfections. 52 First, the State argued that the
education aid formulas were an inappropriate subject for judicial
consideration because educational funding must be balanced
against the State's many other needs and interests, such as health
and public protection.15 3 The State contended that such balancing
is an appropriate subject only for legislative and executive
decisions. 154
Moreover, the State argued that it had met its constitutional re-
sponsibility by providing public schools with adequate levels of
state aid, including more than three billion dollars during the 1974-
75 school year.15 5 The State argued that no specific level of
achievement is guaranteed to any student under the Education Ar-
ticle of the New York State Constitution.'56 The Education Article
guarantees only a basic minimum standard for education, a stan-
dard that New York had met under any reasonable financial mea-
sure.'5 7 At the time, the $1,885 foundation guarantee level was
approximately equal to the average per-pupil expenditure for all
fifty states within the United States. 58
The State also argued the school finance system had reduced sig-
nificantly the disparities in local real property tax resources among
local school districts. 59 The system functioned to provide a greater
amount of aid to poorer districts and to close the gap between the
per-pupil education expenditures of districts at the tenth percentile
of wealth to about one-half that of the districts at the ninetieth
percentile of wealth. 6 °
151. Id. at 38-41.
152. Id. at 41-42.
153. Id. at 41.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 616-17 (Sup. Ct. 1978); see NAT'L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE DIGEST OF EDUCATION STA-
TISTICS 1996/TABLE 166: TOTAL AND CURRENT EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL IN PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: 1919-20 TO 1995-96 (1996), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/d96/D96T166.html (last visited May 15, 2003).
159. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 41-42.
160. Id. at 42.
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Finally, the State relied upon the testimony of a number of state
legislators and school superintendents to demonstrate a rational
basis for the maintenance and operation of the New York school
finance system. 16' The State argued that the system sought to pre-
serve local control of education while providing a minimum level
of state educational funding. 162
On June 23, 1978, presiding New York State Supreme Court Jus-
tice, L. Kingsley Smith, delivered his decision.1 63 Using the ra-
tional means test, Justice Smith found that the State failed to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in maintaining the
New York school finance system and that the original plaintiffs had
established a violation under both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Education Article of the New York Constitution.1 64 Justice
Smith, moreover, determined that the intervenor-plaintiffs, repre-
senting the four large cities outside of New York City, had estab-
lished a violation by the state officers under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. 65 The judge placed
great weight on the compelling nature of the claimants' evidence
and the critical importance of providing education to New York's
children. 166
Following the trial court's decision, the State appealed to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, which al-
lowed the State the opportunity to improve the factual record on
which the New York Court of Appeals would eventually decide the
case. 167 The Appellate Division reasoned that because the original
trial had taken place over the course of nearly four years, a number
of subsequent hearings and stipulation submissions were required
in order to ensure the record accurately reflected the situation on
appeal, especially since a number of reforms had been imple-
mented through legislation. 68
On October 26, 1981, the Appellate Division handed down its
unanimous decision modifying the trial court's judgment.169 The
Appellate Division refused to utilize the standard of strict scrutiny
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 48.
165. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 642 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
166. Id. at 612-16.
167. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 42. It is important to note that the Appellate
Division is a finder of fact as well as of law, which allowed the State to add to the
factual record.
168. Id. at 42-43.
169. Id. at 43.
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against the State, and employed the less stringent intermediate
scrutiny standard in determining the validity of the New York sys-
tem of school finance. 170 The court found the original plaintiffs
had, despite the reforms enacted during the interim, established vi-
olations under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Educa-
tion Article of the New York Constitution.171 The court, however,
determined the intervenor-plaintiffs had failed to establish a viola-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. 172 Subsequently, the State and the intervenor-plaintiffs
appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.173
Attorney General Robert Abrams argued the case for the State
and Daniel P. Levitt, Edward H. Rosenthal, and Miriam R. Best
argued the case for the original plaintiffs.174 The Public Education
Association, the Educational Priorities Panel, and the New York
Civil Liberties Union filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the
original plaintiffs' claim with the Court of Appeals.175 The Council
of Churches for the City of New York, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, and the New York Metropolitan Council of
the American Jewish Congress also filed a joint-brief. 76 A joint
amicus brief, supporting the State's contentions, was also filed on
behalf of eighty-five suburban local school districts and the New
York State Senate majority leader.' 77
Judge Hugh R. Jones delivered the opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals on June 23, 1982 and noted, "No claim is advanced in this
case ... by either the original plaintiffs or the intervenors that the
educational facilities or services provided in the school districts
that they represent fall below the statewide minimum standard of
educational quality and quantity fixed by the Board of Regents.' '1 78
The lack of such a claim, according to the court, was the fatal flaw
in the plaintiffs' case.' 79
Relative to the claims advanced by the original plaintiffs and in-
tervenor-plaintiffs, the court first addressed the argument that the
New York school finance system violated the Equal Protection
170. Id. at 47.
171. Id. at 48.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 43.
174. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 645 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
175. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 43.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 47-48.
179. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 48.
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Clause of the United States Constitution.18 ° Judge Jones noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez had ruled that
in adjudicating such a claim the least stringent judicial standard of
deferential scrutiny should be used in assessing the legality of any
state's school funding system. 181 The New York Court of Appeals
determined that New York did provide a minimum level of funding
to each local school district and allowed for the maintenance of
local control over education, which constituted a legitimate govern-
mental interest. 182 Thus, applying the standard of deferential scru-
tiny, the court rejected the notion the New York system of school
finance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. 183
The Court of Appeals responded, relative to the intervenor-
plaintiffs' argument about the municipal overburden problem, that
the inequalities existing in large cities are the result of intrinsic
demographic, economic, and political factors not attributable to
the action or inaction of the New York State Legislature. 184 Judge
Jones, quoting the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
added:
"It is beyond the power of the court ... to determine whether
the appropriations of the intervenor-plaintiffs have been wisely
directed or reasonable applied, or whether their budgets are
fairly divided in terms of priority of need between the compet-
ing services, such as police, fire, health, housing and transporta-
tion, and it is, equally, beyond the power of this court to
determine whether the resources of the intervenor-plaintiffs can
otherwise be employed so that their educational needs can be
met."'185
Therefore, the court rejected the claim advanced by the inter-
venor-plaintiffs with respect to the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. 86
The Court of Appeals next addressed the claims of the original
plaintiffs and the intervenor-plaintiffs, that the New York school
finance system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the New
180. Id. at 46.
181. Id. at 48.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 364-66 (N.Y. 1982).
185. Id. at 365 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 871 (Sup. Ct.
1981)); BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 49-50.
186. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 48.
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York Constitution.'87 Relying upon the logic utilized by the United
States Supreme Court in deciding Rodriguez, the New York Court
of Appeals again used the less stringent deferential scrutiny stan-
dard and reasoned that:
[t]he circumstances that public education is unquestionably high
on the list of priorities of governmental concern and responsibil-
ity.., does not automatically entitle it to classification as a "fun-
damental constitutional right" triggering a higher standard of
judicial review for the purposes of equal protection analysis.' 88
Based on this standard, the court determined that the State had
demonstrated a rational basis for the maintenance of a program
fulfilling a legitimate governmental interest; thereby, rejecting the
claim that the New York system of school finance violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution. 189
Regarding the claim advanced by the original and intervenor-
plaintiffs that the school finance system violated the education arti-
cle of the New York Constitution, the Court of Appeals ruled that:
[the] constitutional language ... makes no reference to any re-
quirement that the education to be made available be equal or
substantially equal in every district, [nor does it include] any
provision either that districts choosing to provide opportunities
beyond those that other districts might elect or be able to offer
be foreclosed from doing so, [or any provision] that local control
of education, to the extent that a more extensive program were
locally desired and provided, be abolished.1 90
Based upon this reasoning, the court concluded that the only re-
quirement placed upon the state legislature under the Education
Article is to provide for the maintenance and support of a system
of free public schools; a requirement the state legislature clearly
met.19
The New York Court of Appeals left its doors open for possible
future legal challenges by noting that proof of a "gross and glaring
inadequacy" in the education system might give the court cause to
mandate higher priorities for public funds to education.1 92 Addi-
tionally, the majority attributed significance to the absence of a
claim by plaintiffs that educational services in the state fell below a
187. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 47.
188. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 50.
189. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 49.
190. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 368.
191. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 49-52.
192. Id. at 48.
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minimum standard of quality fixed by the Board of Regents.' 93 Al-
though the court rejected plaintiffs' equity-based arguments under
the Equal Protection doctrine, it expressly recognized that New
York courts legitimately could entertain adequacy-based legal
arguments. 94
B. The 1995 Cases
The New York Court of Appeal's recognition of the state's obli-
gation to provide an adequate education in the 1982 Levittown de-
cision, and the successes of school finance litigation in Kentucky,
Montana, and Texas in 1989, prompted several additional lawsuits
by school finance reformers in New York.195 The plaintiffs in more
recent New York cases differ from the Levittown litigants by incor-
porating and focusing legal arguments around claims the State is
failing to meet its burden under the state constitution of providing
an adequate level of public elementary and secondary education.' 96
Daniel P. Levitt, lead counsel and litigator for the Levittown and
REFIT coalitions, noted that the Reform Educational Financing
Inequities Today litigation raised, in essence, many of the same
claims made in Levittown. 97 He remarked, "the big difference,
however, was that REFIT was making the argument the State pub-
lic school finance system created a 'gross and glaring inadequacy'
between school districts and, therefore, violated the standard an-
nounced in Levittown.' '198
The Campaign for Fiscal Equities coalition, on the other hand,
has been influenced by plaintiffs' successes in Kentucky, Montana,
and Texas.199 Jessica Garcia of CFE stressed that the organization
carefully tracks national trends in school finance cases, and that the
plaintiffs' successes were "extremely" influential in CFE's decision
to commence litigation and in shaping its legal claims.2 00 As shown
below, the CFE coalition has emphasized many of the adequacy-
based arguments found in suits from other states.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 51.
195. E.g., Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d
647, 648 (N.Y. 1995) (stating an equal protection claim and violation of the Education
Article of the New York Constitution).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, supra note 73.
199. Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, supra note 75.
200. Id.
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In response to several post-Levittown lawsuits, the New York
Court of Appeals issued three decisions in June 1995 concerning
the State's public school finance system: City of New York v. State
of New York;2 ' Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today
(R.E.F.I. T) v. Cuomo2 °2 ("REFIT"); and Campaign for Fiscal Eq-
uity, Inc. v. State of New York.2 °3 The plaintiffs in City of New York
were the New York City Mayor, Board of Education, and boards
of several city community school districts who sought issuance of
an injunction against the State on behalf of the city's school chil-
dren. °4 The plaintiffs alleged that the State school finance system:
1) denied New York City school children their educational rights
guaranteed by the Education Article of the New York Constitution
by producing a gross and glaring inadequacy with respect to public
education within the city; 2) provided separate and unequal treat-
ment for the public schools within the city in violation of the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York and the United States Consti-
tutions; and 3) disadvantaged New York City schoolchildren who
were members of racial and ethic minorities in violation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.205
At trial, the State moved for dismissal on the grounds of sover-
eign immunity, claiming that a state cannot be sued by one of its
political subdivisions.0 6 The State's motion was granted and the
court dismissed the lawsuit without ruling on the substantive merits
of the plaintiffs' arguments.2"7 The City of New York appealed the
decision to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the Supreme
Court ruling.208
The City of New York subsequently appealed to the New York
Court of Appeals and advanced several arguments.20 9 First, the
City asserted that the Levittown decision constitutes a controlling
precedent in favor of the City's capacity to sue because the New
York Court of Appeals allowed school districts to sue the State.2'
The Court of Appeals, however, responded that Levittown does
not represent a controlling precedent favoring the City's capacity
201. 655 N.E.2d 649, 654 (1995).
202. 655 N.E.2d at 647.
203. 655 N.E.2d 661 (1995).
204. City of N.Y., 655 N.E.2d at 650.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001); City of N.Y., 655 N.E.2d at 650-51.
206. See City of N.Y., 655 N.E.2d at 649, 651-53 (discussing the court's response to
the State's argument that a municipality cannot sue its state).
207. Id. at 651.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 652.
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to sue the State because the opinion did not address specifically
sovereign immunity, as it was not raised by the State as a de-
fense.211 The Court of Appeals added that, in the absence of ex-
press authority to bring the specific action in question, the plaintiff
must establish intent on the part of the state legislature to confer
such capacity by inference, which the City failed to due in this
case.
2 12
The City also argued that a municipality's lack of capacity to sue
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies only to statutory
restrictions on a municipality's power and state-mandated expendi-
tures.2 13 The Court of Appeals responded that this contention ig-
nored long-established precedent by which the lack of capacity to
sue doctrine was extended to a wide range of state actions that
have various adverse impacts upon municipal governing bodies and
their constituents. 1 4
Finally, the City of New York argued it should be allowed to sue
the State because of challenged legislation adversely affecting New
York City's proprietary interests in the State's funding formulas.215
The court replied that the City failed to point to any specific fund
in which they were entitled to a proprietary interest and sought
only a greater portion of the general State funds than the state leg-
islature chose to appropriate for public education.216
Judge Levine of the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
a state could not be sued by one of its political subdivisions. 21 7 This
general incapacity of a municipality to sue flows from the notion
that a state's political subdivisions are created by the state for the
convenient administration of the state's governmental policies. 21 8
As purely creatures or agents of the state, the court continued, a
political subdivision may not contest the actions of its creator af-
fecting them in their governmental capacity or on behalf of its in-
habitants. 219 Therefore, the Court of Appeals upheld the decisions
of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division, which dismissed
the City's action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, con-
211. Id.
212. Id. at 653.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 654.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 651.
219. Id. at 651-52.
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tending that the plaintiffs failed to establish claims falling within
any recognized exceptions to the doctrine. 220
In Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I. T.) v.
Cuomo, a coalition of taxpayers, parents, students, principals, and
superintendents in sixty-one low-wealth suburban school districts
throughout the state filed suit in New York State Supreme Court
against the State of New York. 221 The plaintiffs specifically alleged
that the New York public school finance system violated the Edu-
cation Article of the New York State Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York State and United States
Constitutions.222
The plaintiffs' primary argument was that the New York State
school finance system had changed so drastically since the Court of
Appeals delivered its Levittown decision that there developed a
gross and glaring inadequacy of education funding within certain
property-poor local school districts.223 Levitt, the lead litigator for
REFIT, stressed that the driving force behind the commencement
of litigation was the "feeling among school superintendents and
boards in low-wealth districts that things had gotten much worse
than they were when Levittown was decided and elected officials in
Albany were paralyzed to reform the system. ' '224
REFIT contended that the disparity among a number of local
school districts within Suffolk County with respect to real property
wealth allegedly had grown from approximately 17-1 to approxi-
mately 330-1 in the years after the Levittown decision.225 Further-
more, the plaintiffs asserted that the disparity among these local
school districts with respect to per pupil education expenditures
ranged from approximately $7,000 to approximately $43,000.226
The Supreme Court, however, responded that disparities among
certain local school districts with respect to per-pupil education ex-
penditures were not solely the result of interdistrict disparities with
respect to real property wealth.227 The court found other factors
had contributed to the alleged gross and glaring inadequacy of edu-
cation funding such as a significant increase in non-English speak-
220. Id. at 654.
221. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969,
969 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
222. Id. at 969-70.
223. Id. at 970.
224. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, supra note 73.
225. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72.
226. Id. at 972.
227. Id.
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ing students, a proliferation of expensive State mandates, and the
disproportionate impact of recently reduced State appropriation on
the budgets of property-poor local school districts. 228 The New
York State Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state
a cause of action because the plaintiffs did not specifically allege
that the quality of the education provided to the students residing
within property-poor local school districts fell below a minimum
standard.229
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Appellate Division,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court and added that the
New York school finance system was constitutional. 230 The plain-
tiffs subsequently appealed to the New York Court of Appeals
where Levitt again argued the case for REFIT.231 The Puerto Ri-
can Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Campaign for Fiscal
Equality, Inc., the plaintiffs in the City of New York case, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the New York State Associa-
tion of Small City School Districts filed amicus curiae briefs in sup-
port of the plaintiffs.232
The New York Court of Appeals echoed the Levittown rationale
and rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection argument because the
court reasoned that the desire to maintain local control of educa-
tion was a sufficient rational justification for the state school fund-
ing system.233 The court, however, refused to endorse the
Appellate Division's determination that the school aid formula was
per se constitutional.234 The Court of Appeals limited its holding
to the specifics of the case and directly noted, as it had in the Levit-
town ruling, that evidence of gross and glaring inadequacies in the
state's provisions of a sound education to children could support a
court declaration of unconstitutionality.235
An important aspect of the REFIT case, similar to Levittown,
was the plaintiffs' use, and the Court of Appeal's consideration, of
the Education Article of the New York State Constitution which
mandates: "the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
228. Id.
229. Id. at 976.
230. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44,
45 (App. Div. 1993).
231. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647,
647 (N.Y. 1995).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 648-49.
234. Id. at 649.
235. Id. at 648.
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support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the chil-
dren of this state may be educated. 2 36 The REFIT plaintiffs
claimed that substantial spending disparities between property-rich
and property-poor districts per pupil constituted a violation of the
Education Article. 237 The court responded that the claim of ex-
treme spending disparities alone could not satisfy the "gross and
glaring inadequacy" standard established in Levittown.238 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that although the state constitution's
Education Article required the state legislature to provide a state
system of free schools and an adequate education to the state's
children, the constitution did not expressly mandate equal educa-
tional opportunity. 239 Acknowledging the gross spending dispari-
ties between school districts in the state, the court opined that such
disparities did not establish students in low-wealth and urban dis-
tricts were receiving less than a "sound basic education" in viola-
tion of the New York State Constitution.24 ° Consequently, all
claims against the State of New York were dismissed in the REFIT
case.
241
The Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York was initi-
ated in New York State Supreme Court by a coalition of fourteen
of New York City's thirty-two community school districts, individ-
ual citizens, various parent advocacy groups, and New York City
public school students and their parents, against the State of New
York, the New York State Senate Majority Leader, and the Assem-
bly Minority Leader.242 The plaintiffs alleged that the State school
finance system violated the Education Article, 243 the Anti-discrimi-
nation Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the New York
Constitution,244 the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution,245 and Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964.46
At trial, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss the claims
contending certain plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that the
plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action that could be
236. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
237. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d at 649.
238. Id. at 648-49.
239. Id. at 648.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 649.
242. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. 1995).
243. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
244, Id. art. 1, § 11.
245. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
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adjudicated properly.247 The Supreme Court granted the defend-
ants' motion in part by dismissing all claims asserted by the local
school districts based on sovereign immunity precedent, which pre-
vents any municipal subdivision from suing the state.248 The court
also dismissed the equal protection claims and Title VI claims filed
by CFE and the individual parents and students for failure to state
a cause of action.2 49 The court ruled, however, that the plaintiffs'
complaint raised prima facie claims under the Education Article
and Anti-Discrimination Clause of the New York Constitution as
well as under Title VI's implementing regulations.
The plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Division modified the
order of the Supreme Court by granting the State's motion to dis-
miss.y The Appellate Division ruled that the plaintiffs' argu-
ment-that reduced resources have interfered with the opportunity
of New York City public school students to receive a minimally
adequate education-embodied a theory almost identical to the
one advanced and ultimately rejected by the Court of Appeals in
Levittown.252 Furthermore, the Appellate Division ruled that Title
VI's prohibition against methods of administration that disadvan-
tage racial and ethnic minorities was not violated by the State's
education aid to the New York City school system.253
The CFE coalition subsequently appealed the Appellate Divi-
sion decision's regarding claims under the Education Article and
the Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution, the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the New York Court of
Appeals. 4 The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision of the Appel-
late Division with respect to the anti-discrimination clause of the
New York Constitution.255 Michael A. Rebell, lead counsel and
Executive Director of the CFE coalition, argued the case for the
plaintiffs. 6 The American Civil Liberties Union and the New
York State Association of Small City School Districts, filed briefs
of amicus curiae in support of the position of the plaintiffs.2 5 7
247. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 664.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 663-64.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 664 n.2.
256. Id. at 663.
257. Id.
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The Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of whether the
plaintiffs properly stated a cause of action under the Education Ar-
ticle by claiming that the State's school finance system deprived
public school students within New York City of a sound basic edu-
cation.258 The Education Article, according to the Court of Ap-
peals, requires the State to offer all of its students the opportunity
to receive a sound basic education which; "should consist of the
basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable chil-
dren to eventually function productively as civic participants capa-
ble of voting and serving on a jury. ' 259 The court found that the
plaintiffs' complaint relied upon the minimum statewide educa-
tional standards established by the Board of Regents and the Com-
missioner of Education and, therefore, the plaintiffs properly
stated a cause of action under the Education Article. 260 The court
reinstated the plaintiffs' Education Article claim.261
The court, however, could not adjudicate the merits of plaintiffs'
arguments because there was no factual record developed by the
lower courts, but it did articulate a standard for assessing whether
the State has met its constitutional obligation as follows:
If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources
made available under the present system are adequate to pro-
vide children with the opportunity to obtain these essential
skills, the State will have satisfied its constitutional obligation
... The trial court will have to evaluate whether the children in
plaintiffs' districts are in fact being provided the opportunity to
acquire the basic literacy, calculating and verbal skills necessary
to enable them to function as civic participants capable of voting
and serving as jurors ... In order to succeed in the specific con-
text of this case, plaintiffs will have to establish a causal link
between the present funding system and any proven failure to
provide a sound basic education.262
The Court of Appeals addressed the allegations advanced by the
plaintiffs that the State school finance system violated the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York and the United States Consti-
tutions.263 Although the court recognized that the financial circum-
stances of the school districts might have changed during the
course of the case, the court dismissed the allegations because its
258. Id. at 664-68.
259. Id. at 666.
260. Id. at 666-67.
261. Id. at 667-68.
262. Id. at 666-67.
263. Id. at 668-69.
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interpretation of the equal protection arguments had not changed
since Levittown.264
Finally, the Court of Appeals dealt with the plaintiffs' claims that
the state school finance system violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations, which provide that,
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 265 The court con-
cluded the instant complaint contained no showing of intentional
discrimination and, as a result, the plaintiffs' Title VI claim was
dismissed.266
The implementing regulations, nonetheless, contained within Ti-
tle VI provide that recipients of federal funding may not utilize
methods of administration that disadvantage individuals because of
their race, color, or national origin.267 A successful claim under
Title VI's implementing regulations need only demonstrate dis-
criminatory effect, as opposed to discriminatory intent, and estab-
lish that the challenged practice disadvantages individuals
belonging to a racial minority group and that the practice is not
adequately justified. 68
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant, who must demonstrate that a legitimate nondis-
criminatory basis exists for maintaining the challenged practice.269
If the defendant is able to meet its burden and shows that the chal-
lenged practice is justified or necessary, the plaintiff still has the
opportunity to prevail by demonstrating that less discriminatory al-
ternatives exist.2 70 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found such a
prima facie case in plaintiffs' allegations and reinstated the plain-
tiffs' claim that the State school finance system violated the imple-
menting regulations contained within Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. 27
1
In reviewing the court's reasoning in school finance cases, it is
apparent that the New York Court of Appeals currently refuses to
264. See id. (finding that case law requires intentional discrimination to constitute
an equal protection violation).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
266. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 669.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 670.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 670-71.
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entertain equity-based claims under equal protection doctrine.272
It has, however, accepted the validity of adequacy-based challenges
to the State's education system and to funding formulas as the ar-
guments relate to achieving a sound basic education mandated by
the state constitution's education article.273
The plaintiffs' claims were litigated at a trial that commenced on
October 12, 1999 in New York State Supreme Court.27 4 On Janu-
ary 9, 2001, Judge Leland DeGrasse rendered his opinion declaring
the State's school funding system unconstitutional because it de-
prived New York City school children of a "sound basic education"
guaranteed in the state constitution.275 In particular, Judge
DeGrasse held: 1) the State failed to ensure that New York City's
public schools received adequate funding to afford its students the
"sound basic education" guaranteed by the education article of the
New York Constitution; and 2) the State's funding mechanisms had
an adverse and disparate impact upon New York City's minority
public school students in violation of the implementing regulations
of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act.276
Regarding the plaintiffs' Education Article claim, the court em-
phasized that differences in spending among school districts do not,
standing alone, establish that students in the lower-spending dis-
tricts receive less than a "sound basic education" in violation of the
Education Article.277 Nonetheless, the "sound basic education"
standard mandated by the Education Article of the State Constitu-
tion consists of the foundation students need to become productive
citizens capable of civic engagement and sustaining gainful employ-
ment.278 Judge DeGrasse also stressed that children are entitled to
at least minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms pro-
viding enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to
learn.279
272. See id. at 666-67 (discussing adequacy arguments instead of equity arguments
in analyzing equal protection arguments).
273. Id.
274. Abby Goodnough, Major Court Challenge on How State Allocates School
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at B1 [hereinafter Goodnough, Major Court
Challenge].
275. Abby Goodnough, The Ruling in the Schools: The Overview; State Judge Rules
School Aid System is Unfair to City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at Al [hereinafter
Goodnough, State Judge Rules].
276. See id. (stating that "the school financing system also violated federal civil
rights law because it disproportionately hurt minority students").
277. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (Sup. Ct.
2001).
278. Id. at 485-86.
279. Id. at 501.
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Applying the "sound basic education" standard to the facts of
the case, Judge DeGrasse found: 1) the quality of New York City's
public school teachers, as measured by the number of uncertified
teachers teaching in New York City public schools, teachers' scores
on certification examinations, and the quality of teachers' under-
graduate education, in the aggregate, was inadequate;280 2) a sub-
stantial number of school facilities required major infrastructure
repair and many more were plagued by overcrowding, poor wiring,
pock-marked plaster and peeling paint, inadequate climate control,
and other deficiencies; 281 3) there was a causal link between New
York City's poor school facilities and the performance of stu-
dents;2 82 4) instruments of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils,
and reasonably current textbooks were minimally adequate;28 3 and
5) evaluative examinations indicated New York City's schools were
not imparting the requisite minimum educational skills are indica-
tive of a sound basic education.2 84
Consequently, Judge DeGrasse held that the State is primarily
responsible for the persistence of such educational inadequacies. 85
He also emphasized that the school aid distribution system is un-
necessarily complex and opaque and is based on an array of often
conflicting formulas and grant categories as understood by only a
handful of officers in State government. 86 He found, moreover,
that the evidence at trial demonstrated that the formulas do not
operate neutrally to allocate school funds, but rather, are manipu-
lated to conform to political budget agreements reached by the
Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Senate Majority
Leader. 287 Based on these findings, Judge DeGrasse concluded the
State failed to ensure New York City's public schools received ade-
quate funding to afford students the "sound basic education" guar-
anteed by the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution.288
Relative to the plaintiffs' Title VI claim, the court agreed that
money is a crucial determinant of educational quality, and receipt
of less state educational funding per pupil by minority students is
280. Id. at 492.
281. Id. at 501.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 491.
284. Id. at 491-92.
285. Id. at 529.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 533.
288. Id. at 540.
2003] 1375
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
an adverse, disparate impact as contemplated by Title VI regula-
tions.2 89 The court found that comparisons of New York City's
funding with average school district funding in the rest of the State
can be an accurate and legitimate indicator of a disparate impact
based on race because seventy-three percent of the State's overall
minority student population reside in the City of New York and
eighty-four percent of the city's public school children are mem-
bers of minority groups.29 °
Judge DeGrasse also placed emphasis on the fact that New York
City receives less funding per pupil, on average, than other districts
in the rest of the State.291 The court found that from 1994-95 to
1999-2000, New York City consistently received less total state aid
than its percentage share of total enrolled students. 292 During
those years, New York City had approximately thirty-seven per-
cent of the State's enrolled students, yet received a percentage of
total state aid ranging from 33.98 percent to 35.65 percent.293
Judge DeGrasse concluded that these figures are also clear evi-
dence of disparate impact.294
The State advanced several broad justifications for the distribu-
tion of public elementary and secondary school aid. First, the State
argued that the school funding formula is redistributive in nature
and since New York City is a relatively affluent school district it
should not expect a percentage of state funding to exactly match
the percentage of school children in the State attending New York
City schools.295 Second, the State asserted that a funding formula
based upon each district's average attendance, rather than enroll-
ment, is related to the State's legitimate objectives of encouraging
districts to maintain high attendance while discouraging inflation of
enrollment figures.2 96 Next, the State contended that distributing
transportation and building aid on a reimbursement basis is fiscally
prudent since school districts must first demonstrate a local finan-
cial commitment of facility construction. 97 Finally, New York as-
serted that the funding formulas take student need into account.298
289. Id. at 541.
290. Id. at 542.
291. See id. at 542, 543 n.46 (discussing New York City's per pupil spending).
292. Id. at 543.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 547.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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In response to the State's assertions, the court found redistribu-
tion, when properly implemented, can be a valid goal for state
school aid, but the State's measure of wealth is inaccurate because
it does not account for differences in regional costs and, therefore,
the measure does not further a substantial legitimate purpose.299
Additionally, Judge DeGrasse held that the basing of school fund-
ing on districts' average attendance is unnecessarily punitive in di-
recting state aid away from districts with large numbers of at-risk
students.30 0 The court reasoned that the State neither quantified
the effects of building and transportation aid, nor established how
the system of reimbursement is related to classroom education.30'
Consequently, the court found unpersuasive the State's justifica-
tions for the adverse disparate racial impact caused by the distribu-
tion of state aid, and concluded that the plaintiffs established a
violation of the relevant Title VI implementing regulations.0 2
On the appropriate remedy issue, Judge DeGrasse ruled that the
New York State Legislature, rather than the courts, would be given
the first opportunity to reform public school financing system
which failed to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education
to New York City public school students and had an unjustified
disparate impact on minority students in violation of federal law. 3
The court reasoned that the New York State Legislature is in a
better position to gauge the effects of reform on the state as a
whole, and is better positioned to work with the governor in re-
forming the current educational system.30 4
In response to Judge DeGrasse's decision, Governor George E.
Pataki announced, one week after the ruling, his intention to direct
the State Attorney General to appeal the decision to the Appellate
Division of the New York State Supreme Court.30 The Gover-
nor's announcement was made despite his calls for revamping the
State's school funding system in his January 3, 2001, State of the
State address.30 6 The State filed its appellate brief with the Su-
299. Id. at 548.
300. Id. at 548-49.
301. Id. at 549.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 549-50.
304. Id.
305. Richard Perez-Pena & Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision by Judge
on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al.
306. Id.; see Abby Goodnough, New Formula for Schools: More Money and Lee-
way, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at Bi [hereinafter Goodnough, New Formula].
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preme Court, Appellate Division on August 13, 2001, and the State
and plaintiffs presented oral arguments on October 25, 2001.307
On appeal, the State argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden of demonstrating that: 1) students in urban school dis-
tricts are not receiving a "sound basic education"; and 2) the edu-
cation funding formula utilized by the State is the cause of this
problem.30 8 First, addressing the issue whether New York City stu-
dents are receiving a "sound basic education," the State argued
that the "State of New York ranks third in the nation in education
spending, and that the New York City Board of Education [ ] has
more money per pupil than nearly any other urban school district
in the entire nation. ' 30 9 Moreover, the State argued that New York
City schools receive less funding overall than schools in several
other districts throughout the State because the city does not con-
tribute its fair share to its own public schools and because some of
the Board of Education's resources are wasted through misman-
agement and fraud. 310 The State, therefore, cannot be held ac-
countable for such shortcomings.
Additionally, while the State conceded that the plaintiffs demon-
strated several pressing concerns facing schools in New York City,
the education available in the city's schools, nonetheless, exceeds
the constitutional standard of a "sound basic education. "311 The
State noted that the city's schools have one of the lowest pupil-
teacher ratios among large school districts throughout the nation,
and according to the city's own evaluation system, nearly all of its
teachers are rated as "satisfactory" or better.3t 2 The city's educa-
tional materials and supplies rank at or near the "exemplary" level
and "[s]chool facilities are in fair condition or better, and are suffi-
cient to permit children to learn, as required by the Education
Article. '313
The State next relied on the performance of the New York City
students themselves pointing to statistics showing that "[ninety-
two] percent of the City's eleventh-graders demonstrate graduation
307. Brief for Defendants-Appellants filed by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of
the State of New York at 1, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d
475 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 93-111070); Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, supra
note 75.
308. Brief for Defendants-Appellant's at 2, 6, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. (No.
93-111070).
309. Id. at 1.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 3.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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competency in basic skills" and that New York City students "score
near or above the national average in tests [that compare] their
achievement in reading and math to other students across the
United States. ' 314 The State thus characterizes the New York City
school system, despite its many documented flaws, as one of the
best large urban public school systems in the nation.315
The State asserted that the trial court simply ignored such fac-
tors.31 6 "Instead, the trial court measured the constitutional ade-
quacy of New York City's schools, [especially] the quality of its
teachers, against the resources and performance of wealthy" subur-
ban schools in neighboring districts, despite the fact that the Court
of Appeals has twice held, in both Levittown and REFIT, that this
type of comparative evidence has no relevance to an Education
Article claim.317
In addressing the question of whether any failure to provide a
constitutionally adequate education was caused by the State's edu-
cation funding mechanism, the State argued that the trial court ig-
nored three key factors.31s The court failed to adequately examine:
1) whether the total funding available to New York City's schools
was "sufficient to provide a sound basic education, (even if it was
not actually being used to that effect)"; 2) "whether available re-
sources are squandered due to local mismanagement and corrup-
tion"; or 3) "whether any shortfall in funding is attributable to the
City's failure to make an adequate local contribution. '319 Instead,
the trial court held that such factors were not germane to the in-
quiry because the responsibility to provide a constitutionally ade-
quate education rests squarely with the State.32 °
The State contended, however, that had the trial court ade-
quately examined these factors, the answer to the question of
whether any failure to provide a constitutionally adequate educa-
tion was caused by the State's education funding mechanism would
have been an emphatic "no."'3 21 The State points to statistics show-
ing that "New York City spends more than almost all other urban
school districts across the country-$9,500 per student (based on
Fiscal Year 2000 data)"-and that "[many] schools in New York
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 3-4.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 4.
321. Id.
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City, including those in Community School District [ ] 2 and local
Catholic schools, provide excellent education with significantly less
funding. '322 Moreover, even if these resources are not adequate,
the blame for such insufficiency rests squarely with New York City
and its Board of Education and not with the State's funding
formula.323
Finally, the State noted that, since the present "lawsuit was com-
menced, the State Legislature has dramatically increased education
funding for New York City on its own accord. '324 On the other
hand, New York City has "dramatically decreased the proportion
of the cost of public education [ ] that it absorbs. ' 321 "At the same
time, the [New York City Board of Education] has wasted vast
sums of money through mismanagement and corruption. "326
In its reply, CFE disputed the State's depiction of the quality of
the education available to New York City school children.327 In
order to illustrate the State's failure to provide a constitutionally
adequate education, CFE examined the group of New York City
students scheduled to graduate high school in 1999.328 CFE con-
tended that only "[sixty percent] of the Class of 1999 who entered
the ninth grade would receive a high school diploma. ' 329 Of those
receiving diplomas, many will take as many as seven years to do so
and most will find that they are unprepared for the demands of
citizenship or a productive workplace.33 °
CFE next examined the conditions under which the members of
the Class of 1999 were forced to learn. "In 1988, when the Class of
1999 was in second grade, the system was short 100,000 seats."'331
The state legislature, in fact, declared that New York City's schools
"were in such 'deplorable physical condition' that they were 'a seri-
ous impediment to learning.' ,,332 "In 1995, when the Class of 1999
was in ninth grade, a blue-ribbon commission [declared that the
New York City school system was in] a state of 'imminent calamity'
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 4-5.
326. Id. at 5.
327. Brief for Plaintiffs-Respondents at 1, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 93-111070).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 2.
332. Id.
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and described overcrowded schools that lacked adequate heat,
light and air. 333
According to the CFE, unprepared and unqualified teachers
taught the Class of 1999. 3 1 "When the Class of 1999 was in ele-
mentary school, at least one in ten teachers lacked the minimum
credentials required for certification by the State [and] one of four
elementary teachers had failed the basic teacher competency exam
at least once. '335 "As [these students] moved [up] through junior
and senior high school, [they were] taught by at least 1,500 uncerti-
fied math and science teachers, [compared with] only a handful of
uncertified teachers in the rest of the state. '336 "More than [forty]
percent of the math teachers, [thirty-seven] percent of the biology
teachers, and [twenty-four] percent of the chemistry teachers failed
the certification tests in their subject matter at least once. 337
Finally, CFE focused on other substantial inadequacies within
the New York City school system. 338 For several years, many
schools lacked up-to-date textbooks, libraries, a sufficient number
of computers together with enough teachers who understood how
to use them, and a sufficient supply of basic classroom necessities,
such as pencils and paper.339 Overall, the "Class of 1999 suffered a
collective and cumulative denial of adequate resources, collective
because the multiple inadequacies reinforced each other and cu-
mulative because the inadequacies continued year after year, with
the effects snowballing. "340
The consequences of these inadequacies, according to the CFE,
were devastating.341 "When the Class of 1999 took its first stan-
dardized literacy test in the third grade, [approximately] one-third
of the class, [or about] 20,000 children, was judged to be function-
ally illiterate. '34 2 "By the time the Class reached junior high
school, it ranked last in the state in social studies and science com-
petence.'343 "In 1999, just one-half of the members of the Class of
1999 that entered the ninth grade graduated on time. ' 344 By way
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2-3.
337. Id. at 3.
338. Id. at 4.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 4-5.
342. Id. at 4.
343. Id. at 4-5.
344. Id. at 5.
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of comparison, more than eighty percent graduated on time in the
rest of the State.345 "By the year 2002, when the Class of 1999 is no
longer eligible for free education, [CFE projected that] only an-
other [ten] percent will have graduated. '346
"The history of the Class of 1999 [illustrates] overwhelming sup-
port for the trial court's finding that the [quality of the] 'education
provided to New York City students ... falls well below the mini-
mum constitutional standard.' ,,347 The gross inadequacies plaguing
the New York City school system are directly attributable to the
unmitigated failure of the state education funding mechanism.348
On June 25, 2002, the Appellate Division, First Department, is-
sued a ruling reversing the decision of the trial court.349 Judge Ler-
ner delivered the opinion of the court.350 Beginning with basic
principles, Judge Lerner stated that, while the "sound basic educa-
tion" standard pronounced by the Court of Appeals requires the
State to provide a minimally adequate educational opportunity, it
does not guarantee some higher, largely unspecified level of educa-
tion. 1 Instead, children are entitled to physical facilities and class-
rooms that provide sufficient light, space, heat, and air so as to
permit children to learn.35 2 In addition, children must be given ac-
cess to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning, such as
desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably up-to-date textbooks. 3  Fi-
nally, children are entitled to minimally adequate teaching of basic
curricula, such as reading, writing, arithmetic, science, and social
studies, by personnel that are adequately trained to teach those
subjects.354
Judge Lerner then focused the court's analysis to the issue of
minimally adequate facilities. 5 Although there was evidence that
some schools lack science laboratories, music rooms, or gymnasia,
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that these conditions were so
pervasive as to constitute a system-wide failure.356 Moreover, the
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. (citations omitted).
348. Id.
349. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (Sup. Ct.
2002).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 135.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 139-40.
356. Id.
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plaintiffs certainly failed to demonstrate the existence of a failure
that was caused by the educational funding system or of one that
can be cured only by way of reforming the system.357
Furthermore, the evidence at trial established that class sizes for
kindergarten through the eighth grade average between 23.8 and
28.72 students per class.358 While experts testified that student per-
formance is superior in a class of twenty or fewer children, there
was no indication that students could not learn in classes consisting
of more than twenty pupils. 359 The plaintiffs, in fact, conceded that
the city's Catholic schools outperform the city's public schools de-
spite having larger classes. 360 Thus, the trial court's holding that
classes consisting of greater than twenty students is unconstitu-
tional is unsupported and erroneous.361
Judge Lerner next turned attention to the issue of minimally ad-
equate instrumentalities of learning.362 The plaintiffs conceded
that recent increases in funding have alleviated the shortage of
textbooks and were able to offer only anecdotal evidence regarding
alleged shortages of chalk, paper, desks, chairs, and laboratory sup-
plies.363 Although the average number of books per student in the
city's schools lags behind the rest of the State, and the State allo-
cates only $4 per student for library materials, such factors do not
demonstrate the city's libraries are inadequate.364 Moreover, the
plaintiffs' assertion the books are inadequate with regard to quality
was based solely on certain superintendents' opinions that most of
the books were antiquated and did not address multicultural
themes.365 Judge Lerner rejected such a standard, holding that a
library consisting of classics does not deprive students of a sound
basic education.366
He then addressed the issue of minimally adequate teachers.
The trial court held that teachers in the city's public schools were
unqualified based predominantly on a comparison with teachers in
the rest of the state on teacher certification status, scores on certifi-
cation tests, experience, turnover rate, quality of the institutions
357. Id. at 140.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 140-41.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 141.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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the teachers themselves attended, and the percentage of teachers
holding a Master's Degree or higher.367 Judge Lerner, however,
held that the city's teachers cannot be deemed inadequate simply
because they have lower qualifications than teachers in the rest of
the state.368
The focus was then shifted to the issue of student perform-
ance. 369 The trial court relied primarily upon poor student per-
formance on standardized tests such as Regents Exams and on the
determination of a City University of New York Task Force that
most graduates of city high schools need remediation in one or
more basic skills in holding that students in the city's schools were
being deprived of a sound basic education.370 Judge Lerner, how-
ever, ruled that a minimally adequate education consists only of
those skills necessary to enable students to become productive civic
participants capable of voting and serving on a jury, not to qualify
them for advanced college courses or even attendance at an institu-
tion of higher education.371
Finally, the plaintiffs' case was addressed as a whole.372 In order
to prevail in this case, the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate a
causal link between the present funding system and any proven
failure to provide a minimally adequate educational opportunity.373
Judge Lerner, however, characterized the plaintiffs' position as a
form of res ipsa loquitur-the fact that thirty percent of city stu-
dents drop out and an additional ten percent obtain only a GED,
must mean the funding mechanism utilized by the State has de-
prived city students of a sound basic education.374 Under the cor-
rect constitutional standard, however, "the State must [simply]
offer all [students] the opportunity of a sound basic education. '375
The State is under no obligation to ensure students actually receive
such.376 "[T]he mere fact that some students do not achieve a
sound basic education does not [by itself demonstrate] that the
State has defaulted on its obligation ... as the State [cannot] be
367. Id.
368. Id. at 142.
369. Id. at 142-43.
370. Id. at 142.
371. Id. at 142-43.
372. Id. at 143-48.
373. Id. at 144.
374. Id. at 143.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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faulted when students fail to avail themselves of the opportunities
[provided]. 377
Judge Lerner held, therefore, that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that students in New York City's schools were not being pro-
vided with the opportunity to receive a sound basic education.378
Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any failure on
the part of the city's students to receive a minimally adequate edu-
cational opportunity is the result of the funding mechanism utilized
by the State.379 As a result, the decision of the trial court was
reversed.
The plaintiffs represented by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity co-
alition filed a Notice of Appeal with the New York Court of Ap-
peals on July 22, 2002, citing a major issue of the state
constitutional interpretation thereby requesting an appellate re-
view as a matter of right.3 ° Under procedural rules of the Court of
Appeals, the plaintiff's brief was due by September 20, 2002 and
the State's reply brief due by November 4, 2002, with oral argu-
ments potentially occurring as early as the winter of 2003.381
C. Other School Finance Cases Originating in New York
In Algier Ceaser, Jr. v. George E. Pataki, a group of thirty-three
students and their parents or guardians filed a class action lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against New York Governor George Pataki and other
state officials and entities on behalf of approximately 80,000 stu-
dents attending "high-minority public schools" (defined as schools
with over eighty percent minority enrollment) across New York,
excluding New York City.382 The plaintiffs alleged a violation of
regulations enacted under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and sought injunctive relief to remedy the "unlawful discrimination
that pervades the education that New York State officials are pro-
viding" to the proposed class.383
The plaintiffs cite, in support of their complaint, data published
by the State Education Department showing the academic achieve-
377. Id.
378. Id. at 144.
379. Id.
380. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 1-6, 9-10, Campaign For Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (No. 93-111070).
381. N.Y. CT. App. R. 500.4, 500.5, 500.7.
382. Algier Ceaser, Jr. v. George E. Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2000 U.S. Dist. WL
1154318, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000).
383. Id.
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ment of students in high-minority public schools in New York
State, excluding New York City, is much lower than students in
other non-minority schools across the State. 84 The data showed
great disparities in student performance on several state-adminis-
tered standardized exams, in the awarding of Regents Diplomas,
and in dropout rates.385 The plaintiffs further alleged high-minor-
ity schools have fewer educational resources than other schools
due to the methods of administration the State has utilized in its
operation of its school system, which have disparately effected stu-
dents in high minority schools.386
According to the plaintiffs, such methods of administration in-
clude the discriminatory manner in which the State complies with
and enforces: 1) teacher certification; 2) remedial instruction; 3)
access to suitable and appropriate buildings and grounds; 4) access
to appropriate libraries; 5) the opportunity to take Regents courses
and to earn Regents diplomas; and 6) monitoring of educational
services.387 With this lawsuit, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin these
methods of administration.388
In response to the plaintiffs' complaint, the State filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.389 On August 14, 2000, United States District Court Judge
McKenna issued a Memorandum and Order denying the defend-
ants' motion. 9° Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 "prohibits any recipient of federal financial assistance from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any
federally funded program ' 391 The Civil Rights Act also prohibits
only intentional discrimination, but does bar actions that dispa-
rately impact upon minorities.392 Title VI, however, delegates the
authority to federal agencies to enact regulations incorporating a
disparate impact standard.393 In their complaint, the plaintiffs re-
lied upon a regulation enacted by the former Department of Hous-
ing, Education and Welfare, the predecessor to the current
Department of Education.394
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at *2.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *1.
390. Id.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
392. Ceaser, 2000 WL 1154318, at *2.
393. Id.
394. Id. at *3.
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Plaintiffs need only plead sufficient allegations to put the de-
fendants on notice of what they intend to prove at trial to survive a
motion to dismiss.395 In this case, Judge McKenna ruled that the
plaintiffs satisfied this burden and that the defendants' motion to
dismiss was denied.396 The trial, thus, moved forward, the conclu-
sion to which has yet to be reached.
In Amber Paynter v. State of New York, a group of fifteen stu-
dents in the Rochester City School District ("RCSD") and their
parents or guardians filed a lawsuit in New York State Supreme
Court, individually and on behalf of approximately 37,000 other
students in the RCSD.397 The suit was filed against New York
State and several state officers and entities, alleging that students
are being deprived of a sound basic education, in violation of the
New York Constitution, in light of the concentration of poor and
minority students within the Rochester City School District.398
Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged an intentional discrimination
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,399 a disparate impact
claim under regulations implementing Title VI, 40 and a claim for
violation of those regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.401
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin
the State to provide them with constitutionally adequate education,
educational opportunities on par with those provided to students in
the other school districts in Monroe County, a racially diverse
learning environment not characterized by high concentrations of
poverty, and an educational system that does not impose a racially
disparate impact.4 °2 In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss
all claims.40 3 The Supreme Court granted the State's motion in
part, dismissing the cause of action under the Education Article,
but not the cause of action alleging an intentional discrimination
claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the disparate
impact claim under regulations implementing Title VI, and a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of those regulations.40 4
395. Id. at *4.
396. Id.
397. Amber Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
398. Id.
399. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
400. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000).
401. Paynter, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
2003] 1387
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
The plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, and the State cross-appealed.40 5 The State
contended that the lower court erred in not dismissing the plain-
tiffs' complaint in its entirety. 4 6 The plaintiffs contended that the
cause of action under the Education Article should be rein-
stated.4 °7 On December 21, 2001, the Appellate Division issued its
ruling.40 8
With respect to their Education Article claim, the court noted
that the plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of State funding,
nor do they challenge the adequacy of the educational services and
facilities being provided.40 9 Instead, the court explained that the
plaintiffs focus solely on the "wholesale academic future" of the
students in the RCSD, which they attribute to the high concentra-
tion of poor and minority students within the district as well as the
system of public education mandating that students attend schools
only within the district in which they live.410
The plaintiffs went on to allege that but for this residency re-
quirement, the demographics of RCSD would be greatly different,
the quality of education would be far better, and they would re-
ceive the sound basic education they are entitled to under the Edu-
cation Article. 411 They argued that they stated a viable cause of
action under the Education Article by virtue of their allegations of
"wholesale academic failure" alone.412
The Appellate Division, however, disagreed. 413 Academic fail-
ure as measured by students' performance on standardized tests
does not, by itself, represent a constitutional violation.414 Aca-
demic failure may be the result of a variety of causes that are be-
yond the scope of State control.415 A constitutional violation arises
only when such academic failure is the result of the State's failure
to provide for the maintenance and support of the public school
system. 416 The obligation imposed upon the State under the Edu-
cation Article is satisfied as long as the physical facilities and edu-
405. Id.
406. Id. at 340-41.
407. Id. at 341.
408. Id. at 337.
409. Id. at 343.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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cational resources made available under the current system are
adequate to provide students with the opportunity to obtain a
sound basic education.41 7 In light of the plaintiffs' failure to allege
that minimally adequate educational services and facilities were
provided in the RCSD by the State, they failed to state a claim
under the Education Article for which relief can be granted. 18
The Appellate Division next addressed the plaintiffs' additional
claims.4 19 Under the regulations established by the United States
Department of Education, programs that receive federal funds are
prohibited from using methods of administration that impose a dis-
parate impact upon individuals because of their race, color, or na-
tional origin.42 This proscription applies to determinations
regarding the types of services, financial aid, or facilities that are
provided under such programs or the class of individuals to whom
such services are to be provided.421
The Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the
residency-based system of education provided for under New York
Education Law section 3202422 has exacted a racially disparate im-
pact upon the students in the RCSD.42 a Moreover, even assuming,
arguendo, such a system does have a racially disparate impact, the
Appellate Division held that it did not violate 34 C.F.R. section
100.3(b)(2) as long as it is uniformly applied because the State has
a substantial interest in imposing bona fide residency requirements
in order to maintain the quality of local public schools.424 Thus,
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that Education Law section
3202 is not being uniformly applied, they did not state a cause of
action under 34 C.F.R. section 100.3(b)(2) for which relief can be
granted.425 Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court was
modified and the Appellate Division granted the State's Motion to
Dismiss in its entirety.426
In March of 2001, the New York Civil Liberties Union
("N.Y.C.L.U.") filed a class action lawsuit, New York Civil Liber-
ties Union v. State of New York, in the Supreme Court in Albany
417. Id.
418. Id. at 343-44.
419. Id. at 344.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 2003).
423. Paynter, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 344-45.
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County against New York State and several State officers and enti-
ties on behalf of parents and children in "failing schools" through-
out the State.427 Building on the decisions in Campaign for Fiscal
Equity and relying upon the Education Article of the New York
Constitution, this is a school-based litigation that seeks to supple-
ment the remedy requested in Campaign for Fiscal Equity and
seeks judicial supervision of a school by school analysis of the roots
of failure and the particular remedies for each failing school to be
provided by the State.428
A substantial number of students, the plaintiffs argue, in each of
these "failing schools" are unable to perform at the minimum stan-
dards established by the New York State Department of Education
on standardized tests in the areas of reading, writing and math.429
These "failing schools" tend to generally possess some or all of the
following characteristics: a highly transient teaching staff, unquali-
fied teachers, textbooks and computers that are inadequate in both
quality and quantity, crumbling facilities, overcrowding, inade-
quate focus on the core-curriculum, poor administrative leadership,
class sizes far too large for the many "high need" children in the
classes, no sense of community, inability to involve parents in
school activities, and insufficient programs for art, music, and
athletics.430
The plaintiffs also assert student performance in these "failing
schools" is terrible. 431 A large number of students read below
grade level and many fail to perform well enough on standardized
tests in reading, writing, and math to demonstrate even basic skill
levels.432 Students at the high school level rarely receive Regents
diplomas, as most are suspended or drop out at a staggering rate.433
The plaintiffs charge that the New York State Department of
Education is keenly aware these schools are failing.434 Nonethe-
less, the State has failed to take adequate measures to remedy the
deficiencies plaguing these "failing schools. '435 Those students
427. Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union at 1, NYCLU v. State (Sup. Ct.
2001) (No. 01-1778).
428. Id. at 1-4; see Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 661-65
(N.Y. 1995).
429. Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union at 68, NYCLU (No. 01-1778).
430. Id. at 140.
431. Id. at 3-4, 27.
432. See id. 29-30, 88-91 (discussing programs to remedy the significant amount of
students reading below level and students substandard performance on tests).
433. Id. at 199-200.
434. Id. at 191-92.
435. See id. at 193-200 (discussing the states remedy to inferior education).
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who, by reason of race, residency or economic status, are consigned
to these failing schools are being denied the opportunity to receive
a "sound basic education. ' 436 These students, according to the
plaintiffs, are at serious risk of failing to acquire the basic skills
necessary to become productive citizens capable of civic engage-
ment and of sustaining competitive employment.4 37 As of the writ-
ing of this Article, the trial has yet to take place.
CONCLUSION
The Unites States Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez, in ef-
fect, forced public school finance reformers to litigate their claims
against state education funding schemes in state courts. 438 Efforts
of reform-minded plaintiffs in state courts resulted in two distinct
litigation and doctrinal trends-equity and adequacy. Although
equity theory showed some promise in the earlier state cases of
Serrano4 39 and Robinson,441 legal challenges based on arguments
for greater equity proved difficult to substantiate because the
courts were not willing to hold states to substantial or strict scru-
tiny standards for their public elementary and secondary school
funding systems. The New York Court of Appeals in Levittown
particularly emphasized that the State is only required to provide a
sound basic education, not to provide an equitable distribution of
funding to public schools. Consequently, equity-based legal argu-
ments resulted in few litigation victories in other states and have
been de-emphasized by New York school finance reform
plaintiffs.44'
Successful litigation in Montana, Kentucky, and Texas, however,
has demonstrated the efficacy of adequacy-based legal arguments
and offered renewed and real hope of litigation success for plain-
tiffs challenging state public school financing systems. Adequacy
theory in school finance litigation is predicated on the use of state
constitutional provisions requiring a state to provide a minimally
adequate public education to its schoolchildren. Plaintiffs have
been able to convince state high courts that poor educational out-
puts, such as high failing percentages on statewide tests and high
436. See id. at 6 (discussing the inadequacies and disadvantages that these students
encounter).
437. Id.
438. Supra notes 26-76 and accompanying text.
439. Supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
440. Supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
441. Supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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dropout rates, and lack of sufficient education tools including text-
books, classrooms, and teachers, together constitute a failure of a
state to meet its constitutional burden of providing adequate public
education.
Accordingly, adequacy theory offers a potentially greater chance
of success to the plaintiffs in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case
because plaintiffs have little difficulty citing numerous shortcom-
ings of the public schools, especially in poor urban districts, to sup-
port their arguments that the state is failing to provide a sound,
basic education. This litigation strategy cleverly avoids the prob-
lem of focusing too much attention upon only the levels or equity
of funding New York is providing to public education, instead em-
phasizing the numerous inadequacies of public elementary and sec-
ondary schools which are exacerbated by lack of sufficient state
funding. The remaining difficult legal challenge is convincing the
New York Court of Appeals that the daunting problems of poor
public schools establishes a "gross and glaring inadequacy" and,
consequently, a failure of the state to provide a sound basic educa-
tion as required by the state constitution.
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